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Neutrality,﻿Religious﻿Symbols﻿and﻿the﻿Question﻿of﻿a﻿
European﻿Public﻿Sphere1
Kostas Koukouzelis
Abstract: In the last two decades there has been an on-going, fierce debate in 
members and candidate members of the European Union concerning the use of 
religious symbols in the public sphere. The exemplary case is, without doubt, the 
case of the Muslim headscarves, a case that emerged particularly in France and 
Germany, but also in other places, such as the Netherlands and Turkey. Taking stock 
mainly from the French example we shall focus on the main normative justification 
of the prohibition of religious symbols, that is, the principle of laicité conceived as 
state neutrality. The latter should not be interpreted as secularism, that is, a strict 
separation between private and public space. Laicité as neutrality should neither 
be seen in a moralistic way nor privatize religious identity. Part II will examine 
the jurisprudence of the issue commenting on cases recently adjudicated by the 
ECtHR. The Court, unfortunately, recognizes a ‘margin of appreciation’ to member 
states, when the prohibition of religious symbols constitutes a form of both direct 
and indirect discrimination. Finally, in part III, we will argue that neutrality should 
be interpreted as real not formal equality towards both religious and non-religious 
beliefs. Freedom of conscience is intrinsically connected to its public manifesta-
tion, which makes the public sphere constitutive of subjectivity. This cuts across 
the private/public divide and resists the insistence of multiculturalists on collective 
rights. The task of instituting a European public sphere is a struggle for equality not 
for common cultural identity.
Keywords:﻿ difference, neutrality, headscarves, religious symbols, public 
sphere, Europe
I.﻿ Common﻿values﻿and﻿religious﻿symbols
The European Union derives its strength from common values of democracy and 
human rights, which rally its people, and has preserved the diversity of cultures and 
languages and the traditions which make it what it is.
The Schuman Declaration (Fontaine, 2000:7)
1 Many thanks to Panayiotis Flessas, Dimitris Kyritsis, Leda Lakka and an anonymous referee of 
this journal for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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The passage just quoted describes in a nutshell one of the fundamental common 
assumptions about the EU’s derivation of its moral and political legitimacy. Its 
references and use of notions like ‘common’, ‘values’, ‘democracy’, ‘human rights’ 
for example is characteristic of a certain way of evaluating the project of European 
‘integration’. Nevertheless, what is missing from this formulation is whether what 
is described above as a plane of common presuppositions has already taken place or 
is about to be materialized as a task. In other words, there is an inherent ambiguity 
about whether what is described is indeed a fact – the reality of common values of 
democracy and human rights – or a value – the same common values waiting to be 
realized. This ambiguity is no mere theoretical pretension of the demand for more 
theory, but it is rather irreducibly constitutive of the European project. There are 
significant and diverse implications, which follow from whichever of the two horns 
of this dilemma one ascribes to.
The problem of religious symbols in general and the affair of the Muslim head-
scarves in particular, as presented in most European countries, although particu-
larly in France, provides us with an example of conflictual cultural identity politics, 
and the issues deployed in it – the overlapping representations of gender, class, 
ethnicity and race, and mostly religious identity in the nation-state context – are 
crucial in the context of the ambiguity of the European project we identified above. 
The recently imposed complete ban of religious symbols in French public schools 
puts the issue of equality, difference and identity under renewed pressure. While 
traditional countries of destination regarding immigration, like the US and Canada, 
have been dealing with cultural clashes and accommodation of ‘non-western’ re-
ligions for decades, rising immigrant populations pose a new dilemma for Euro-
pean countries, forcing society and politicians to rethink their established cultural 
identity. Multiculturalism puts the stakes for a coherent and fair liberal politics 
extremely high, not the least because European liberal democracies have to take a 
stance on how they treat the emergence of new fundamentalisms and whether they 
compromise liberty or perhaps deepen their conception of what liberalism truly 
demands.2
Neutrality has been the standard answer of the liberal, democratic state to reli-
gious and cultural difference. Its classic justification can be found in J. S. Mill’s 
thesis that power must not be exercised over people for non-neutral reasons (Mill 
1962), and much earlier in John Locke’s plea for toleration and his insistence that 
the state must stay clear of the so-called care of the souls (Locke 1983 [1689]). 
2 Historically speaking, it is important to point out here that contemporary multiculturalism is 
a phase in the return of post-colonial people to the metropolis. It is the meeting point of the 
normative history of the West and the counter-history of its realization; see Bhabha 1990: 218 and 
Emmer 1993.
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It also constitutes a fundamental thesis in contemporary liberal legal and political 
philosophy, which broadly shares the view that ‘a neutral state is one that deals 
impartially with its citizens and remains neutral on the issue of what sort of lives 
they should lead’ [Jones 1989, 9].3 Nevertheless, the interesting thing is that neu-
trality is equally claimed by both the proponents and the opponents of the ban of 
religious symbols in European countries.4 Such a thing makes us realize that there 
is an important element of truth regarding the question of the character and nature 
of what is actually ‘common’ in Europe.
However, the argument of this article can only be described as a modest and 
primarily a negative one. If the justification of the French law on the ban of all 
religious symbols, including Muslim headscarves, and other European states’ treat-
ment of the issue is based on some conception of neutrality, then it would be an 
important task for us to clarify what neutrality is not and what it should not be. The 
confusion on the issue might stem from neutrality’s Janus-faced nature: it may be 
a device of inclusion for minorities who understand neutrality as the equal right to 
pursue their way of life as they see fit; but it may also be a device for exclusion, via 
strengthening the necessarily particular boundaries and sense of collective self of 
the dominant group. Accordingly, in the next part (II), we will focus on the French 
case trying to give a brief account of the French notion of laicité and its interpreta-
tion as strict separation between state and church (secularism). This particular in-
terpretation will be linked to a certain, i.e. perfectionist, interpretation of it, which, 
allegedly, tries to emancipate young students. Furthermore, we will also consider 
a libertarian interpretation of laicité, that is, conceived as privatization of religious 
identity. Part III will provide us with an overview of the problematic and conflicting 
treatment of religious symbols by European countries and mostly by the European 
Court of Human Rights [ECtHR]. In the end, we shall conclude that should neutral-
ity be a fundamental value embodied in the European Convention of Human Rights 
[ECHR], its interpretation has to (a) be unified as a core common value in the EU 
and (b) take the form of a specific conception of equality appropriate in a public 
sphere that is constitutive of subjectivity.
3 State neutrality is advocated by contemporary liberal thinkers. Rawls especially places the foun-
dation of state neutrality on the key distinction between the ‘right’ and the ‘good’ prioritizing the 
former in relation to the latter. Briefly, the ‘good’ responds to the question ‘how should we live 
whatever the circumstances?’, whereas the ‘right’ responds to the prior and independent question 
‘under what circumstances is it possible to live as we should?’ Rawls subscribes then to ‘neutrality 
of aim or justification’, which is the claim that the justification (rather than the effect) of state 
action has to be neutral (Rawls 1988: 260–264). For more on liberal neutrality see among others 
Goodin and Reeve 1989.
4 The principles of state neutrality together with equality of respect and freedom of religion form 
constitutive elements of the interpretation of laicité as the Stasi Commission reported to the Fren-
ch National Assembly when it justified its proposal for the law banning all religious symbols from 
public sphere. 
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On the ban of headscarves in French public schools:  
laicité and neutrality
After several years of indecisive mutterings, during which school principals were 
keeping the courts busy by expelling scarf-wearing girls, 9/11 put the matter in 
more pressing terms, with the wearing of the headscarves being depicted as an im-
minent threat to the French Republic, an islamization of its education.5 All parties, 
with very few exceptions, coincided politically on the same position: keeping young 
Muslim women out of public school because of the cultural (religious) distinctive-
ness of their dress. The immediate justification was that wearing headscarves chal-
lenges the national principle of secular education and French citizenship. Only the 
absolute rule of laicité, by which the young women should abide, could save these 
women from the tyranny of their fathers! As a consequence of that, and after much 
controversy, the French National Assembly passed legislation, which prohibits all 
symbols and clothing that draw attention to [manifestent ostensiblement] the reli-
gious affiliations of pupils in the public primary, middle and high schools.6 This 
included big Christian crosses and Jewish skullcaps (kippas).
In France, laicité, a principle that has a long and revealing tradition that dates 
back to the years of the Revolution, has its roots back in a 1905 law that institutes 
officially the separation between state and church and remains active until the 80s 
as a fundamental constitutional principle (Troper 2000: 1267). Generally speaking, 
the meaning of the separation between state and religion is that the state has to be 
laic, that is, neutral in a very specific way. The principle of laicité takes the meaning 
of a strict separation between state and church (Haarcher 2004: 5). This conception 
of the principle is translated into a polemic attitude against any religion. It becomes 
then an anti-religious doctrine and laicité equals in that sense secularization, which 
transforms the strict separation of state and church into state’s own ‘combat neutral-
ity’ (Poulter 1997: 50).7 Thus, whereas some young Muslims thought that their 
freedom of religious practice, indeed their religious identity, should be respected in 
its public manifestation, the French state banned exactly this ‘public manifestation’ 
5 Nevertheless, the Conseil d’ État’s decision of 27 November 1989 annulled the exclusion of three 
Muslim girls arguing in favor of a ‘liberal’ conception of neutrality: neutrality for students means 
‘freedom of conscience’, which allows them to express their religious affiliations even in the 
classroom. The carrying of the veil was, according to the court, an expression of fundamental 
religious liberties and goes hand in hand with the equality of all religions (William 1991). The 
judicial emphasis on the rights of students is of pivotal importance as it was abandoned, later on, 
in the adoption of the law by the ‘republican’ conception of neutrality. 
6 No. 2004–228.
7 Seyla Benhabib, for example, seems to share such a view when she defines laicity as ‘public and 
manifest neutrality of the state toward all kinds of religious practices, institutionalized through 
a vigilant removal of sectarian religious symbols, signs, icons, and items of clothing from of-
ficial public spheres’ (Benhabib 2004: chapter 5); on the history of laicity in France see Baubérot 
2003. 
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on grounds that this goes against the French commitment to the principle of state 
neutrality in the sense of strict separation or ‘combat neutrality’. Since the French 
revolution religious freedom becomes one of the most important legally protected 
rights, but the movement from the religious to the nation-state left in place a one-
way, assimilative politics of identity.
To be clear, the normative justifications of this legislative initiative, which are at 
the same time interpretations of the principle of laicité, were mainly two: (a) the 
ban on all religious symbols contributes to the protection and respect of individual 
autonomy and human dignity of the students by actually creating more space for 
freedom for those who within public schools want to criticize and transgress the 
narrow religious and cultural identity imposed on them by their families and narrow 
traditions; (b) citizens of a secular state must accept the shared, that is, public and 
secular identity if they want to be part of such a community, and this contributes to 
the maintenance and stability of the public order. The point of this conception of 
neutrality that follows from it, is to create a neutral public space free from the influ-
ence of religious belief, a ‘space’ that young people might occupy in order to con-
stitute and reconstitute their ideas and values free from intimidating and conflictual 
manifestations of religious faith. But is this what this public ‘space’ achieves in the 
end or does it threaten cultural difference by either assimilating or completely neu-
tralizing it? Is this a retreat for the liberal, democratic state and a serious inability 
to understand the challenges posed by both pluralism and multiculturalism? Let us 
turn to these two normative justifications. The first justification of the prohibition 
corresponds to a ‘perfectionist’ interpretation, and the second justification is based 
on a ‘libertarian’ interpretation of the principle of laicité as neutrality in public 
sphere.8
IIa.﻿ The﻿‘perfectionist’﻿interpretation﻿of﻿laicité
The ‘perfectionist’ argument that is implied by the first normative justifica-
tion refers to the aim of emancipation and is mainly grounded on its respect and 
protection of individual autonomy as an intrinsic part of the ‘good’ (Raz 1986). 
Thus, autonomous choices are, as a matter of principle, tolerated, whereas non-
autonomous ones are not. But such a view makes the unwarranted assumption that 
Islamic headscarves are prima facie symbols of young girls’ subordination and pa-
triarchal tyranny. Nevertheless, this is only partly true, because many Muslim girls 
wear their headgear voluntarily. The issue then becomes one of how one distin-
guishes voluntary from non voluntary submission, and whether one respects such 
a voluntary submission, one that arguably might impair the possibility of the girls’ 
8 Similar categorizations are used by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti (2002: 115–136) and more recently 
by Cecile Laborde (Laborde 2005), who follows mainly R. Audi’s exposition in Audi 1989.
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future free choices. The ‘perfectionist’ would clearly not consider such choices 
autonomously made, and therefore should not have to respect them.9 Moreover, 
this opens the path for a wider range of state interference. For example, why does 
the state’s ‘perfectionist’, arguably paternalistic, intervention not apply to other, 
comparably ambiguous, family decisions to transmit traditional values and beliefs, 
such as sending children to religious catechism? Where would the state’s judgment 
on what constitutes an autonomous choice have to stop?10
To be sure, this effort does not stand far from a politics of assimilation. Let us see 
how such an assimilation is justified, although assimilation and neutralization in the 
above sense can, under conditions, support each other.11 This kind of French-repub-
lican laicity and neutrality, because it seems to justify the claim that the freedom to 
manifest one’s religion publicly potentially violates the freedom of others, because 
it allegedly functions as propaganda, proselytism or intimidation, postulates at the 
same time a conception of civic identity, the identity of the French citizen as a 
counter-system to religion. Having its roots in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen the French nation builders try to emancipate students by claiming 
that emancipation, and unity in the public realm are the outcome of the constitution 
of a national identity, the constitution of a homogeneous people [peuple]. Such 
an enterprise has to be carried out by the triadic ‘reason-science-progress’ (Morin 
1990: 38, Laborde 2005: 315–316). Indeed, the principle of laicity became a way to 
forge unity in a diversified society.12 This is an important point, because the French-
republican conception of neutrality considers school as a separate space where the 
particularisms and factual constraints of life are suspended. But laicité aims to 
emancipate children from the confines of their social backgrounds and to transform 
believers into true citizens. This presupposes that students are not treated as equal 
individuals and citizens who enjoy freedom of religious conscience and expression, 
but as individuals-in-the-making bereft of any cultural trace, and the school as the 
laboratory of the future. The school, under this conception of laicity, is exactly 
the institution whose purpose is to form them and establish unity in a diversified 
9 J. S. Mill has made clear that a freedom to enslave oneself cannot be respected (Mill 1962). 
Arguably, this was one of the mistakes French feminism committed when defended the ban of 
religious symbols as an effort to emancipate young women; see, for example, A. Vigerie and A. 
Zelensky, ‘La’cardes, puisque féministes’, Le Monde 30/5/2003. 
10 To be more precise here, I do not mean that it is illegitimate for perfectionists to be worried about 
the power relations internal to a specific group. W. Kymlicka clearly rejects internal restrictions 
infringing fundamental rights. What I object to is that autonomy can be enforced in such a way. 
Indeed, many non-Muslims tend to conformist ways of life, yet they should not be ‘forced to be 
free’. 
11 We are referring to the legitimacy of assimilation and not to political inclusion, which is exactly 
the real question we are supposed to answer here. 
12 Note here that in France the whole issue of headscarves was largely put in terms of what it means 
to be ‘French’ nowadays. However, the same issue arised lately in Britain around ‘Britishness’. 
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immigrant society.13 But this conception of laicité might function exactly, as Rawls 
has acutely stated, as a ‘comprehensive doctrine’ that simply replaces in a crude 
way the old substantive view of the ‘good life’ defined by religion by a new vision 
of the ‘good’ defined secularly by reason and scientific progress creating another, 
although secular now, comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 1993: xviii, 175, also Taylor 
1998). The school, as an extension of the public sphere, is transformed into secular 
catechism.
The ‘perfectionist’ argument presented here can be also stated in different, although 
quite similar to the preceding view terms: the law banning religious symbols is nor-
matively justified in the name of the protection of human dignity. The normative 
justification of the French law can be depicted that way should one adopt an interpre-
tation of the headscarf as an a priori symbol of women’s oppression. Through such 
an interpretation one can defend an objective violation of human dignity and discard 
the subjective criterion of its definition. This definition of human dignity takes us at 
the heart of the foundations of the system of rights. In the conflict between an objec-
tive and a subjective definition of an offence against human dignity the opposition 
is between an individualist, liberal conception of rights, which guarantees respect 
for self-determination and makes the individual the ultimate judge of her own dig-
nity, and a communitarian conception, which makes community’s conception the 
objective criterion of an offence against human dignity. This second view places 
human dignity in opposition to freedom of conscience. It presents, in other words, 
human dignity not being possessed by the individual herself, but as translated into 
a legal obligation to respect one’s own freedom, and not exclusively other people’s 
freedom. Such a view opens the path for ‘objective’ (moral, philosophical, religious) 
conceptions of human dignity, which simply mask conceptions of human dignity 
formed by the majority. Nevertheless, rights are subjective and cannot be defined by 
democratic majority as they constitute exactly a guarantee protection against it.14 The 
liberal conception of rights argues that the offence has to be substantiated through 
the subject’s consent. In our case, if Muslim girls do not think that their wearing of 
the headscarves constitutes a violation of their human dignity it is not possible for 
the law to intervene. This does not mean that the rejection of perfectionism and its 
paternalistic flavor is simply the whole story here. Rights should refer to further non-
subjective conditions of the possibility of their exercise. However, in the following 
section we shall see why non-interference just is not enough.
13 This is how the Debray Commission, established by the French National Assembly in the summer 
of 2003 for studying the affair of the headscarves and recommending state policy, justified its 
recommendation for a law that bans all religious symbols (Debray Report 2003, Vol. 1: 30). A 
detailed analysis of both the theory and politics of the French state can be found in Joppke 2007. 
14 The effort to ‘objectively’ define human dignity leads to ‘legal moralism’; see the classic debate 
between H. L. A. Hart and Lord Devlin in Hart 1963.
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IIb.﻿ The﻿‘libertarian’﻿argument:﻿neutrality﻿as﻿privatization﻿of﻿identity
A further consequence of the interpretation of laicité as ‘combat neutrality’ is that 
the secular state demands that what is to be tolerated has to remain strictly private 
vis-à-vis a public sphere, where, on the contrary, the same rules apply to all. Here 
the institution of the private/public divide is of utmost importance, something not 
so straightforward in the ‘perfectionist’ argument, and the public education system 
is arguably included in such a public sphere, indeed it is an extension of it. What 
is now protected is a thinner conception of liberty (negative liberty), that is, one’s 
right to individual choices and preferences, which should not be violated. In this 
sense, differences are understood as being themselves reducible to differences be-
tween particular individuals. A neutral public space then is supposed to be ‘blind to 
differences’ exactly by trying to be anti-discriminatory in its treatment of citizens. 
Early modernity is to be blamed for that, which recognizes only a species identity, 
the identity proper to human species, but demands the definition of humanness (na-
ture, substance, reason etc.) in terms of common traits. Following this approach the 
values of abstract/universal humanism were incorporated in the 1789 Declaration 
of the Rights of Man, which recognizes the same and equal rights to all.15
But now the problem becomes one of how to determine what counts as actually 
trespassing in the public sphere – a particularly thorny problem in the course of 
drawing the line between what constitutes a public, ostentatious manifestation and 
a neutral, discreet dress symbol! Notice here the inherent weaknesses of such a 
law in the case of the ban of all religious emblems in France. Such a law is first of 
all unable to determine which emblems go against the norm and second determine 
firmly who is constrained by the norm itself. In the first case it is extremely difficult 
for the law, which wants to pick up ‘ostensible manifestations’, to determine which 
article of clothing or hairstyle (or indeed beard) violates the norm. This would entail 
an effort to determine the students’ intentions on the basis of size, color and shape of 
clothing or style of appearance. Why is it a scarf and not a bandana, why is it a beard 
and not a moustache? This is clearly a major retreat in the liberal character of law.
Evaluating the case of the ban of religious symbols in public education we are 
faced with a paradox in the French-republican conception of culture. In principle, 
the creation of a neutral public sphere does not denote an ethical life, but constitutes 
the ‘bond’ between identity and administration. It is now a ‘neutral’ culture that 
unifies; a de-centered perspective based on a human rights discourse, ‘sensitive’ to 
difference and social equality. This means that cultural identities can in principle be 
preserved instead of being assimilated. Nevertheless, this does not escape cultural 
15 For the problems such an abstract universalism focused on identity has caused to democratic 
citizenship see particularly Renault & Mesure 2002. Kant remains an exception to this as he sees 
subjectivity in a non-reductive to any empirical content way. 
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identity politics, for there is an inherent paradox here. On the one hand, one has to 
belong to such a group in order to participate in the public sphere,16 while on the 
other, as soon as cultural identity becomes the defining factor for participation, it 
becomes depoliticized. Cultural identity is included only to get excluded in terms 
of a neutral culture. This is a strategic move: it preserves cultural pluralism at the 
expense of making it politically irrelevant. There is a clear logic of inclusion/exclu-
sion inscribed here. This is also the case with the Muslim girls. At a first level their 
identity is included, but only to be excluded, that is, ‘neutralized’ at a second level.
The argument coming from the French conception of the liberal state insists on the 
assumption that secular equality provides a public space for equal freedom whereas 
religious and cultural differences stay at the level of ‘individual’ life. Muslim girls are 
not refused the right to practice their religion in private. In that sense neutrality equals 
privatization of whatever religious beliefs people have – arguably, what is banned is 
not religious belief but its public manifestation. Difference becomes then, or, more 
strongly, it should become, a private issue (Barry 2001: 24–25). But this conception 
of the notion of neutrality in law bases its authority on a false conception of impar-
tiality of reason. The state’s role then is primarily a negative one: it should not force 
minority groups to conform to the dominant culture; law secures non-interference. 
Minorities then enjoy formal equality before the law, which means that they are not 
assimilated, but are left free to develop or disappear (Laborde 2005:308–309). Nev-
ertheless, the partiality of such a conception has been pointed out by both liberals and 
non-liberals. It chiefly conforms to Christian, white males. Instead of being neutral 
and negative this conception forgets that there are neither neutral procedures, nor neu-
tral values. Neutrality, should it possess a value, cannot but be based on non-neutral 
institutions (Young 1990:116). Therefore, it is unclear why only students in schools 
and not also parents entering these public places should be required to remove such 
‘ostensible’ signs. In any case, it would be a contradiction in terms to have ‘neutral’ 
marks of ‘identity’. In the end, only ‘pure nakedness’ or indeed ‘pure abstraction’ 
would probably succeed in fitting into this model. As we tried to argue above, this is 
a neutral public space in the sense of constituting an ‘empty signifier’, which needs 
to be filled in some way or another and potentially fosters an increasing intolerance, 
which favors a process of normalization driven by the dominance of the strongest 
group, in our case, a conception of what it means to be a ‘proper’ French citizen!17
The argument here might remind us of Marx’s classic but controversial early essay 
on the problem of Jewish rights within European secular states (Marx 1975 [1843]). 
16 Here, I have in mind the opposite case of the sans papiers in France.
17 For these objections see Bowen 2004; Bowen rightly says that these are no mere practical pro-
blems, but hide a growing intolerance, exactly the opposite of complete indifference, now not 
based on ‘biological’ inferiority but on a ‘cultural’ one; see Hardt and Negri 2000: 190–192. 
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Indeed, Marx insists that a declaration of freedom from ‘religious identity’, as in 
the dismissal of all religious symbols in the case of French laicité, does not liberate 
the individual from the conditions constitutive or reiterative of such identity. To 
the contrary, it is only in abstraction from such conditions that the individual is 
claimed to have been ‘emancipated’ by the universal state; this is, according to him, 
a ‘devious emancipation’.18 Marx’s critique of the constitutional state as such – then 
the French and North American versions of constitutionalism – sees religion not as 
the basis but as the phenomenon of secular narrowness itself (Marx 1975 [1843]: 
217). Marx argues that religion becomes just a non-political distinction that the 
state presupposes in order to exist!
To be sure, this might be a proof that ‘identity’ was the only means for modern de-
mocracies, taken as nation-states, to constitute themselves as communities. This is 
not the case anymore (Andersen 2003). Multicultural communities have to base the 
social ‘bond’ upon something else altogether. In the French-republican paradigm, 
as we reconstructed it, secular equality oscillates between a ‘particular’ privatized 
identity, and a public ‘universal’, and abstract one. A fierce criticism of such a 
conception has recently been put forward by M. Hardt and A. Negri (2000). The 
‘paradox’ mentioned above is described now as comprised of three moments: one 
inclusive, another differential, and a third managerial. The first is the ‘libertarian’ 
moment: all are welcome within, regardless of race, creed, color, sexual orienta-
tion, and so forth. In its inclusionary, juridical moment it is ‘blind’ to differences. 
But in its cultural moment differences are celebrated! These differences are now 
cultural and contingent, rather than biological and essential. We say cultural and not 
political, exactly under the assumption that they are confined to private beliefs and 
will not create conflicts. Finally, the managerial moment controls what is mainly 
‘neutralized’, which is the same as its being naturalized (Hardt and Negri 2000: 
198–199). Consequently, the libertarian interpretation of laicité argues that multi-
culturalism does not create differences, but takes what is given and works with it.
III.﻿ ﻿Religious﻿symbols﻿in﻿Europe﻿and﻿the﻿European Convention 
of Human Rights
The French case has been indeed the paradigmatic case among countries in the 
Europe. However, there are many interesting cases and different approaches in other 
countries such as Britain, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and particularly Turkey. 
In most of them the approach is quite different from the French interpretation of the 
18 Note that the ‘deviousness’ mentioned by Marx is not only a moral objection to hypocrisy, so-
mething that would confine his criticism within the liberal framework, but a critique of Hegelian 
dialectics of subreption [Aufhebung], liberation through a medium, which thinks that it can ac-
commodate real movement and change within itself; see Marx 1975 [1843]: 218. 
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principle of laicité as ‘combat neutrality’, and some of them adopt an interpretation 
of neutrality as even-handedness rather than strict separation. In Britain the situation 
is the opposite than the one in France. British courts have ensured that religion is ac-
commodated in the public sphere, provided there is no threat to security or the proper 
function of institutions. Muslim headscarves and Sikh turbans have traditionally been 
allowed in the schoolroom.19 In Germany, for example, the German Constitutional 
Court in the Teacher Headscarf case upheld a Muslim teacher’s right to wear a head-
scarf in the classroom.20 Germany conceives state neutrality as ‘open neutrality’ as 
opposed to French laicité as ‘combat neutrality’. ‘Open neutrality’ means that the state 
sees its task as assuring that individuals can express and live out their religious convic-
tions not only in private but also in public. Moreover, the state does not identify with 
any one religion, but all religions in society are treated in an even-handed and impartial 
way.21 Nevertheless, this might even have changed lately since in the spring of 2004 the 
city of Berlin passed legislation prohibiting all religious symbols. Furthermore, Italy’s 
strong ties to the Catholic church influence its cultural and legal approach, and although 
there is official separation of state and church, and symbols are permissible on school 
property and public offices, recently the highest court upheld the display of crucifixes 
in schools on the grounds that the crucifix is a symbol of the values at the foundation of 
Italian society. Finally, there is a typical ‘pillar’ tradition in the Netherlands, which has 
created self-organization of immigrant groups in closed communities. There are state-
subsidized private schools on equal footing with public schools. This ‘pillar’ system, 
although liberal and tolerant of religious symbols, has caused enormous problems, 
indeed, a ‘tribalization’ of Dutch society (Maris 2007: 7–10).
The widespread nature of the religious symbols debate and the various political 
and cultural factors influencing interpretations of neutrality in France and other 
European countries, give rise to the question of how these national differences will 
shape the scope of freedom of religion within European human rights law at the 
regional level. Are contextual solutions important? However, there is already an 
emerging jurisprudence in a number of cases. In its judgments the ECtHR used 
both the principles of secularism and neutrality: ‘[…] the Convention institutions 
have expressed the view that the principle of secularism is certainly one of the 
fundamental principles of the state, which are in harmony with the rule of law and 
respect for human rights and democracy’.22 The quotation is taken from a case 
19 Following the 1983 case of Mandla v. Powell.
20 Ludin Case no. 2BvR 1436/2002 and in the German Constitutional Court BverfG 
NJW.2003.3111.
21 See Joppke, 2007: 326–336; for a good presentation of the different approaches in most of the 
European countries, but also in Canada and the US, see particularly Barnett 2006.
22 Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party) and others v. Turkey (Grand Chamber Judgment), Strasbourg, 
Feb. 13, 2003. 
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involving the ban of a political party in Turkey, the Refah party. The party was at 
the time of the ban in government and was the largest one in the country. One of 
the main arguments was exactly that the party was threatening the principle of 
secularism enshrined by the Turkish Constitution, because it was allowing women 
to wear headscarves when entering public institutions. By upholding the ban of the 
Refah party the Court seemed to interpret the notion of neutrality in the closed, 
restricted way we analyzed above. Furthermore, in the Dahlab case23 the ECtHR 
accepted Switzerland’s arguments that a teacher’s headscarf might both disturb the 
‘public order’ or religious harmony of the school and also influence the pupils in a 
way that constituted a threat to their – and their parents’ – rights according to the 
ECHR First Additional Protocol, art. 2. This was accepted although there had been 
no complaints from any child or parents. In this case and in the next one, the lack of 
emphasis on individual behavior or characteristics making the prohibitions reason-
able in practice implies that the Court accepts a general ban on certain expressions 
of religious self-identification inside public institutions. Once more, the impression 
that the Strasbourg Court opts for a kind of ‘closed neutrality’ seems to be clear.
Yet, the most interesting example we have available is the recently adjudicated 
case of Leyla Sahin v. Turkey by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of 
Human Rights.24 What makes this particular case interesting are the similarities 
it bears to the French case. In a similar to the French case line of justification the 
ECtHR held unanimously that there had been no violation of Sahin’s freedom of 
thought, conscience, or religion under the ECHR Article 9 or other article. Arti-
cle 9 para 1 protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion: ‘[…] this right 
includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone, or in 
community with others and in public or private, to manifest [emphasis mine] his 
religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance’. Para 2 permits 
certain restrictions on the basis of public safety, protection of public order, health 
or morals, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Quoting explicitly the French National Assembly’s law of 2004, which banned 
‘visible’ religious symbols in schools, it stated that the University of Istanbul’s 
regulations, of which Sahin was a student, imposing restrictions on the wearing of 
headscarves were justified according to the Turkish constitutional principle of secu-
larism, endorsing essentially the normative reasons given by the French state we 
analysed above. Furthermore, the court also applied the doctrine that the states have 
a ‘margin of appreciation’ when called to regulate religious and cultural difference 
in light of their traditions and best interest. It specifically stated that ‘[b]y reason 
23 Dahlab v. Switzerland (Application no. 42393/98), 15 Feb 2001.
24 Leyla Sahin v. Turkey (Grand Chamber Judgment), Application no. 44774/1998, November 
2005.
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of their direct and continuous contact with the education community, the university 
authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local 
needs and conditions or the requirements of a particular course’.25 The questions 
that are raised here are mainly two: (a) is the ECtHR’s treatment of religious sym-
bols according to Article 9 of the ECHR prone to the same criticisms regarding the 
French interpretation of the principle of state neutrality? (b) is the appeal to the 
‘margin of appreciation’ the right approach adopted by the court? In other words, 
does it represent the common European values of democracy and human rights and, 
in the end, what kind of diversity does it preserve?
(a) The Sahin case seems that it involves the same notion of neutrality we identi-
fied above as ‘closed neutrality’. Moreover, what would be interesting here to stress 
is that, even according to the Court’s own jurisprudence, both the French and Turkish 
laws might be responsible for ‘indirect discrimination’ against under art. 14 of the 
ECHR. Direct discrimination according to that occurs when states treat differently 
persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable jus-
tification. Indirect discrimination though occurs when states fail to treat differently 
persons whose situations are significantly different.26 The EU Council also operates 
with such a notion which is defined in a way more suitable to our argument here. 
Indirect discrimination occurs when an ‘apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice’ would put persons at a particular disadvantage compared to other persons.27 
Drawn on our analysis of the French case, one realizes that the law, although ‘neu-
tral’ on its face, affects first and foremost manifestations of Islamic identity. This is 
because the prohibition would not affect more ‘discrete’ as opposed to ‘ostentatious’ 
religious symbols. In the French case religious symbols like necklaces with little 
crosses on pupils and teachers pass the test. Hence what it is restricted is the rights 
of persons who by conviction want to wear ‘visible’ or ‘ostentatious’ symbols, while 
those whose religious, or perhaps non-religious, convictions require them to carry 
only ‘discrete’ signs or no signs at all are not therefore affected at all.28
(b) In challenging the majority’s delegation of decision-making authority to the 
member states the only dissenting judge in the Sahin case called into question the 
‘margin of appreciation’ approach used by the majority. First, the majority claimed 
that the diversity of practice between member states on the issue of regulating the 
wearing of religious symbols in educational institutions showed that there was no 
25 Sahin 2005, para. 121; also Skach, 2006: 188.
26 In this way the Court extended further the notion of ‘direct discrimination’ in Thlimmenos v. 
Greece 6. 4. 2001.
27 EU Council Directive 2000/78/EC.
28 It is true that within contemporary liberalism there is disagreement on the best way to satisfy the 
principle of non-discrimination, that is, whether it is best to disregard differences or to take them 
into account so as to counter the different value that is socially attached. We will argue for the 
latter case.
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European consensus and that national authorities are better placed to strike a balance. 
Nevertheless, first of all, this claim was not really true, because apart from France 
and Turkey no other contracting state had bans in place on religious symbols at the 
level of public education. But the appeal to consensus raises further problems: does 
the Court refer to past or current consensus, and does the Court need to wait until 
contracting states reach such a consensus over time? This approach is surely relativ-
istic regarding human rights, and seriously undermines the Schuman Declaration on 
common values. Second, the most important objection was that, despite the court’s 
choice to use the margin of appreciation, it was essentially ignoring its obligation to 
provide the necessary ‘European supervision’ on such matters. The dissenting judge 
insisted that the issue was not merely a local one, but one of importance to all mem-
ber states. European supervision could not, therefore, be escaped simply by invoking 
the margin of appreciation, as the ECtHR has the task to protect human rights on 
a subsidiary basis.29 What the Court had to do in such a case was to give judgment 
on the issue of whether collective interests, such as the maintenance of public order, 
morals – what constitute the ‘limitation clauses’ in art. 9 para 2 of the ECHR – are 
violations of freedom of religion and its manifestation. This is indeed an important 
legal issue, yet it is also an essential aspect of political morality here.30
The force of the ‘limitation clauses’ like the maintenance and preservation of ‘pub-
lic order’ makes sense only within a theory that treats both rights and collective goals 
as protecting interests. A sufficient quantity then of some particular common inter-
ests, ‘security’ for example, could outweigh interests protected by human rights, as 
in versions of utilitarianism and other interest-based theories of rights. However, this 
is not how rights should be viewed. People have rights to specific liberties (religion, 
expression) and cannot be deprived of them on an inegalitarian basis, such as that 
their conception of the good life is simply inferior. To be sure, it is absolutely impos-
sible to establish the case that religious symbols as such potentially threaten public 
order, and morals. Oddly, in the Sahin case the Court held that secularism must take 
precedence over freedom of religion. The only way for this particular argument to 
make sense is that the principle of secularism is perceived as a significant broaden-
ing of the ‘public order’ justification. As such, public order is interpreted as extend-
ing to the point where it encompasses deeply held cultural values of secularism in 
the public sphere, something that undermines any prospect of common values. The 
focus of rights though should be to guarantee that a political community treats their 
members as equals. It is equality not common cultural identity that unifies. To this 
fundamental demand of political morality we finally turn now.
29 Sahin 2005, dissent, para. 3.
30 For an illuminating take on the different conceptions of the margin of appreciation and more 
generally on the interpretation of the ‘limitation clauses’ in the ECHR see especially Letsas 2007: 
80–98, 117–119. 
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IV.﻿ ﻿Neutrality﻿as﻿equality:﻿the﻿task﻿of﻿instituting﻿a﻿European﻿
public﻿sphere
The ECtHR has also expressed its dedication to the principle of neutrality and its 
relationship to other values: ‘[t]he Court has frequently emphasized the State’s role 
as the neutral and impartial organizer [emphasis mine] of the exercise of various 
religions, faiths and beliefs, and stated that this role is conducive to public order, re-
ligious harmony and tolerance in a democratic society’.31 How should we interpret 
then this principle? Interpreted through the ambiguous conception of French style 
laicité neutrality is difference-blind and abstentionist regardless of race, colour, 
and faith. But, according to our argument, it should not have the meaning of secu-
larization, that is, a strict separation between state and religion. The consequences 
of such a misinterpretation were identified above as involving outmoded efforts to 
integrate difference through creating unity by employing another, non-religious, 
comprehensive doctrine. Therefore, these efforts violate the very essence of neu-
trality towards conceptions of the ‘good’ life. Such a misinterpretation also rests on 
a false separation of public and private. A neutral state should not privatize religious 
and cultural identity. What it should protect though is that, whatever process of de-
cision is being made by the individual regarding this identity, must not be a process 
that is forced or a product of social engineering. Privatization completely neutral-
izes difference and makes it being exactly non-political by imprisoning it, making 
people of religious and cultural minorities feeling shame and inferiority not only 
as individuals but also as members of certain groups that are stigmatized (Galeotti 
2002). This approach represents a conception of ‘closed neutrality’, indeed a kind 
of ‘fundamentalist secularism’ that corresponds to an instrumental conception of 
public sphere.
At its core, freedom of religion encompasses both a negative dimension – noone 
can be forced, directly or indirectly, to recognize a particular religion or to act con-
trary to what he or she believes – and a positive dimension – freedom to believe and 
to manifest one’s own religion. Religion is indeed a matter of personal conscience 
(forum internum), yet conscience remains opaque even to ourselves should it not 
have the absolutely crucial chance to manifest itself in public, that is, to express 
itself and therefore be realized in the world. Without public manifestation private 
space becomes then only a fortress.32 If freedom of conscience and expression are 
tightly connected publicity cannot be an external to the individual framework, 
31 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, op. cit., referring to several other judgments where the statement is 
made.
32 Kant defends such a thesis in his famous essay An Answer to the Question: What is Enligh-
tenment? It has been pointed out that Kant does not use the term ‘private’ as synonymous with 
individual perspective, or to refer to the merely personal; see Auxter 1981: 306. Auxter uses 
‘private’ to mean that which falls short of the complete development of human capacities. 
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but becomes constitutive of subjectivity having a non instrumental value. Neutral-
ity must be then no longer an alternative system to religion, but rather a regulating 
principle for the pluralism of both religious and nonreligious (philosophical, ethi-
cal) convictions existing in civil society. Freedom of conscience and manifestation 
becomes then part of individual self-determination and is being translated both into 
a right to difference and a right to belong in a certain religious group, community 
(identity). This interpretation of freedom of conscience and its relation to mani-
festation is explicitly adopted by art. 9 of the ECHR as mentioned above, which 
closely links freedom of conscience and manifestation. Clearly this is an approach 
essentially different from a Lockean in spirit liberalism.
Such a different approach interprets now laicity and neutrality not as strict sepa-
ration, but as equality, that is equal treatment of both religious and non-religious 
doctrines. Rights, like freedom of religion and its manifestation are important for 
our status as free and equal citizens who are responsible for choosing and pursuing 
our own conception of the good life. In our case, the state must in principle ac-
cept publicly visible manifestations of religion, and its ritual expressions in public 
space. Religion should not be relegated to the private sphere because expression 
is inherently social due to its crucial characteristic that it engages difference by 
opening it up to communication, be it either rational or of another, symbolic nature. 
Liberal neutrality through constitutionalism should manage to emancipate not only 
from religion, but also from any homogenizing force, including the nation-state. 
An effective process of emancipation cannot be based on a prohibition, but on open 
expression and manifestation of religious or non-religious beliefs.
However, this particular form of neutrality pertains to the consequences of state 
action, and not only to aim and justification: whatever the state does, the interests of 
all affected parties ought to be affected in the same way. This form of neutrality cor-
responds not to formal, but to real equality, which entails positive action on behalf 
of the state and might include policies of affirmative action (Laborde 2005:328–
329).33 Modern state should not have a negative role (protection and preservation 
of the forum internum) but also a positive role in providing the public space suit-
able for the subjectivity’s responsible expression and development. It is important 
33 Neutrality and equality are intimately connected especially in R. Dworkin’s theory of rights. 
Dworkin argues that a government treats people as equals only if it is neutral towards their con-
ception of the good life. Nevertheless, one has to dig deeper in relation to their interconnection. 
Accordingly, neutrality of effect is rejected by Rawls because, as he argues, it is virtually impossi-
ble for the basic structure not to have influences as to which comprehensive doctrines endure and 
gain adherents over time (Rawls 1993: 193). I think this approach is misguided as endurance of a 
religion or culture should not be based on the Darwinian law of the survival of the fittest, but on 
the free development of human potential, and imprisonment to the private does not constitute such 
a free development. Unfortunately, further discussion of this version of state neutrality is beyond 
the scope of this article. 
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to note here that, according to the conception of neutrality as equality, the school 
institution should not be an extra-societal refuge, but a mirror of society’s plural-
ism, with the mandate to prepare students for what they will encounter in society.34 
In the end, pluralism only makes sense when it is recognized in the public sphere 
and becomes toothless when confined into the private.
The interpretations of neutrality described above are indeed in opposition to what 
is nowadays being put forward as multicultural recognition (Taylor 1992, Kymlicka 
1995), and the latter has been extremely helpful in making us realize the drawbacks 
of certain misconceptions of neutrality. Yet, the link of freedom of conscience with 
its manifestation in public cuts across the private/public distinction and does not 
make the interpretation of neutrality reductively individualistic.35 Furthemore, the 
opposition to neutrality as equality is not so clear. Among other things, multicul-
tural recognition works differently for different groups, and multiculturalism is 
often conceived as differentiated rules for different ethical identities.36 Yet, this is 
not incompatible with a conception of justice that treats similar cases in a simi-
lar way and different cases differently. A theory of rights cannot be blind to dif-
ferences. Blindness towards differences disappears though as soon as we realize 
that the bearers of subjective rights constitute themselves intersubjectively. This 
is absolutely crucial as the public manifestation of one’s religion should also lead 
to the public use of one’s reason. Such a thing is an exercise of public, not just 
private, autonomy. Subjective rights that protect autonomous life cannot in the end 
be articulated properly if subjects themselves cannot manifest in full range, that is, 
publicly as embodied persons, their views about the effects of policies on them. Ex-
ercising public autonomy helps citizens creating representations of and realize their 
true and legitimate interests. Private autonomy is guaranteed only by the exercise of 
our autonomy in the public sphere.
Consequently, the contemporary problem of the treatment of religious symbols in 
European countries teaches us a bitter lesson about the fragility of our democracies. 
A politics of the bogus neutrality we described throughout the presentation enforces 
feelings of powerlessness and exclusion even within an inclusionary democratic 
logic. We have then the ‘paradox’, akin to the ‘paradox’ of the French-republican 
conception of culture, according to which one claims to defend young girls against 
34 However, we should draw attention here to the fact that, for example, the removal of the cruci-
fix from classrooms in order not to intimidate non-religious or non-Christian students would be 
entirely legitimate as a state policy as it involves the school as an institution and not the students 
themselves. A public institution protects and fosters people’s freedom not the other way around. 
See the Dahlab v. Switzerland decision, op. cit., for an example of this point. 
35 As communitarians and multiculturalists alike assume it is.
36 The important issue whether this entails recognition of collective rights in addition to indivi-
dual rights has to be left open here, although to argue for collective rights seems to me highly 
controversial.
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religious fundamentalism, of which sexism is an intrinsic part, by banishing them 
from school, i.e. making them personally – in their lives, their futures, their flesh 
– bear the penalty for the injustice of which they are the ‘victims’, and sending 
them back to the communitarian space dominated by precisely this religious sexism 
(Balibar 2004: 354). This move opposes a fundamentalist secularism to religious 
fundamentalism, undermining in the end any prospect for the emergence of a Eu-
ropean public sphere. If domination comes from both ‘public’ and ‘private’, then it 
is surely natural for them to take the part of their most familiar space. In that sense, 
religious fundamentalism might indeed be not a pre-modern, but a post-modern 
state challenge (Bhabha 1990; Hardt and Negri 2000: 147–150).
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